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Abstract
During the Second World War, the Horn of Africa staged 
unusual and fast shifting encounters among the colonizers, 
the colonized, and would be super powers. Governments 
acted according to their own war time needs and postwar 
aspirations imbued with the Cold War. Investigating 
how this transpired in Ethiopia offers valuable insights 
about the wartime status of international laws regarding 
the management of property belonging to enemy states 
and their nationals. However, this is a sidelined aspect 
in the historiography of the Second World War. Using 
fresh archives and secondary sources, this article situates 
the British and Ethiopian treatment of Italian property in 
Ethiopia in the global discourse of the custodianship of 
enemy property. States mostly disregarded international 
law as political exigency and war time needs were 
given priority. As abstract laws had nominal respect, 
only individuals with technical, political and security 
profiles relevant to the victors enjoyed a relatively better 
protection. Besides, the victors absolved themselves 
from responsibility by including self-serving clauses in 
the peace agreement signed in Paris. Like other success 
factors, custodianship of enemy property was crucial in 
the rise and fall of firms. In this regard, the twentieth 
century was hardly progressive than preceding centuries 
were. 
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INTRODUCTION
Over centuries states have expressed their tenets pertaining 
to the disposal of enemy property in treaties, conventions 
and agreements signed at bilateral and multilateral levels. 
In the twentieth century, states also established ownership 
with relevant laws and regulations to administer the 
property of enemy states and their nationals. The gulf 
separating legal idealism and political exigency in the 
actual treatment of enemy property was wide for political 
and economic reasons and pretexts, although there have 
been a few success stories. Studying the wartime laws and 
practices of combatants vis-à-vis enemy property helps 
a better understanding of the changing lots of firms and 
states in world economic history. However, historiography 
is almost silent on this vital aspect of economic history, 
which could play an important role in the development of 
international law for a more secure world in terms of the 
flow of people and capital. 
During the five year occupation of Ethiopia by Italy, 
1935-1941, Italy and Italians invested a great deal in 
manufacturing, infrastructure, and the service sectors with 
considerable success. The scale of investment in such a 
brief period was unmatched by the pace of development 
in other African colonies. Hence, when the Italians lost 
the war against the British and the Ethiopians, there was 
considerable booty to appropriate. Britain and Ethiopia 
had established their own Custodian of Enemy Property 
ostensibly to administer Italian property according to 
international law- to ensure the safekeeping and the 
eventual transfer of property to its legitimate owners. 
As will be seen, very few have written about the fate 
of Italian property and businesses in Ethiopia. Such works 
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suffer from shallow and one-sided use of sources and do 
not recount the story in light of broader and longer global 
experiences. In fact, the very issue of the custodianship 
of enemy property in wartime seems a neglected aspect 
of historiography, even among economic historians. 
This neglect constitutes a clear lacuna in our historical 
understanding of the circumstances of the rise and fall of 
states, small firms, and large international corporations. 
This article intends to make a modest contribution 
to encourage research interest in the management of 
enemy property, which seems to be a promising field 
of investigation to fathom the dramatic upward and 
downward economic mobility of states in general, and 
private firms and corporations in particular. This is relevant 
not just for the sake of understanding history but also to 
generate practical insight for the management of enemy 
property in the future. Studying relevant international 
conventions, academic publications and archival data from 
the Custodians of Enemy Property and different ministries 
of the Ethiopian and British governments, the article 
reconstructs the history of the disposal of enemy property 
in Ethiopia. By situating the story in the global discourse, 
the article shows the salient norms in the wartime policies 
and practices of financing wars and compensating damages 
incurred by states and their nationals. 
1.   GLOBAL PRECEDENT-  LEGAL 
STATUS AND ACTUAL EXACTION OF 
PRIVATE ENEMY PROPERTY ININ WAR
Because states have long enacted laws and signed 
bilateral and multilateral agreements and conventions 
relating to the wartime disposal of enemy property, a 
brief outline of such global historical precedents as a 
foreground to the disposal of enemy (Italian) property in 
Ethiopia is necessary. Ostensibly, the wartime treatment 
of the property of an enemy state and its nationals in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was claimed to 
have been governed by ‘international law’, which found 
expression in bilateral and multilateral agreements. Such 
provisions had the flavor of eighteenth century juridical 
values, especially as regards the sanctity of private 
property in war. The law stipulated that: ‘Those surviving 
the devastating effects of unmitigated war should have 
something left with which to take up again the thread of 
life.’1
Article XXIII of the 1799 treaty between Prussia and 
the USA granted a nine-month period for merchants in 
enemy territory to settle their debt and property issues or 
to evacuate with their belongings freely. It also provided 
for the economic freedom and property protection of 
enemy citizens engaged in other economic activities. The 
1 Seymour J. Rubin, ‘Inviolability of Enemy Private Property’ in the 
American Journal of International Law, Vol. XCV, (1950), p.167.
governments could confiscate the private property of 
enemy state citizens without prejudice to compensation 
due to owners.2 The historical value of the treaty is 
small since its signatories did not go to war. Of practical 
experience about disregarding the inviolability of private 
property we have the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, during 
which, a British diplomat noted, “The three Prussian 
armies and their insatiable ‘requisition commandos’ had 
succeeded in reducing Austria north of the Danube to a 
vast desert.” Requisitions were ‘paid’ for by paper receipts 
which were hardly honored for repayment by anyone.3 On 
a positive note, private property was respected during the 
Spanish-American War, thanks to President McKinley’s 
proclamation of April 26, 1898, ordering Spanish ships to 
leave American ports within a month.4
The 1899 Hague Agreement outlawed the confiscation 
of private property, which seems to be a multilateral 
convention influenced by preceding customary rules.5 It 
granted the victim of requisition to payment in cash or 
the issuance of a receipt to acknowledge the requisition. 
This, however, was a privilege property owners could 
only enjoy if they were neutral in the war. Moreover, 
requisition was considered congruent with the ‘eternal’ 
principle that war must support war through requisitioning 
supplies for invading armies.6 Hence, international law 
did not give unconditional inviolability to private property 
since it could be overlooked should military necessity so 
require.7 Nonetheless, states increasingly sensed the need 
to differentiate between the treatment of combatants and 
non-combatants and private or public properties.8
During the early stage of World War I, governments 
refrained from confiscating private enemy property mainly 
to prevent reprisals against their own citizens living in 
enemy territory, rather than because of a commitment to 
legality and humanitarian values. After a while, enemy 
property was appropriated according to wartime needs. 
The British sequestrated German property worth about a 
billion dollars. Russia did the same from early 1915 on 
except that Germans paying a special tax were exempt 
from sequestration. The USA, through the May 1917 
presidential order, authorized the confiscation of enemy 
vessels in American ports.9
2 Ibid., p.166.
3 Geoffrey Wawro, The Austro-Prussian War: Austria’s War with 
Prussia and Italy in 1866 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), p.276. 
4 Rex M. Potterf, ‘Treatment of Alien Enemy Property in War Time 
and After by the United States’ in Indiana Law Journal: Vol.2: Iss. 
6, (1927), p.456.
5 Ibid., p.453. 
6 William Gerald Downyer, ‘Captured Enemy Property: Booty of War and 
Seized Enemy Property’ in The American Journal of International Law 
Vol. 44, No. 3 (Jul., 1950), p.490; Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War: 
Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1977), p.5. 
7 Potterf, ‘Treatment of …’, pp.453-4, 490.
8 Ibid., pp.456-7.
9 Ibid.
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The Versailles Peace Treaty made no departure in the 
protection of private enemy property. Article 297 accorded 
the Allied Powers ‘the right to retain and liquidate all 
the property rights and interests’ of Germans in Allied 
territory to meet compensation claims of Allied citizens 
and the reparation claims of Allied Powers so that only 
the remaining balance would be returned to the original 
property owners. Germany assumed responsibility to 
redress the loss caused to its own nationals. Germany 
suffered from similar compensation arrangements 
under the Treaty of Berlin, which concluded the war 
between Germany and the USA. The USA rationalized 
the confiscation of ‘hostile’ private Germany property 
in 1919, claiming that some German investments had 
supported the German army. Warehouses, factories, and 
offices were regarded as German spy centers and ‘... 
would have been nests of sedition if the Alien Property 
Custodian had not acted promptly in their seizure. … no 
obligation is owed to their private owners.…’10
Stating that nearly 5000 sequestrated German 
investments had sinister motives to ‘dominate’ the US 
industry, the custodian, Mr. Palmer, claimed that the 
confiscation of such properties amounted to destroying a 
‘sinister alien power in the United States’.11 The USA was 
more interested in using enemy property to finance the 
war than concerned with the rights of enemy nationals.12 
Besides, the victors employed a reversal of the ‘thread of 
life’ argument: the damage suffered by their own citizens 
should be compensated at the expense of enemy property. 
At any rate, the Allies could not return enemy property to 
its private owners and yet expect a reparation amount that 
exceeded the entire assets of defeated states.13 The framers 
of the Versailles Peace Treaty, June 28, 1919, felt justified 
in imposing harsh treaty terms citing the statement of the 
German peace delegates, whose May 22 note reads:
The German peace delegation is conscious of the fact that under 
the pressure of the burden arising from the peace treaty on the 
whole future of German economic life, German property in 
foreign countries cannot be maintained to its previous extent. 
On the contrary, Germany, in order to meet her pecuniary 
obligations, will have to sacrifice this property abroad in wide 
measure. She is prepared to do so.14
Given the role private investments in foreign 
markets had on the foreign exchange between the 
warring governments, the private property of enemy 
nationals was seldom purely viewed as a private matter. 
Cognizant of this, Allied governments ordered their 
nationals to liquidate their foreign investments in enemy 
countries during the war. Against this background, it 
was unacceptable for Allied countries to allow enemy 
10  Rubin, ‘Inviolability, p.172.
11 Potterf, ‘Treatment of …’, pp.466-7.
12 Ibid., pp.460, 463, 469.
13  Rubin, ‘Inviolability…’, pp.175, 177.
14 Ibid., pp.178-9.
investors to emerge from the war with huge foreign assets 
while their own nationals were not provided with a similar 
opportunity. That being the argument, the terms ‘private 
property’ and ‘confiscation’ were regarded as misleading. 
In what Rubin calls a ‘compelling’ conclusion, ‘…enemy 
property assets should, not only for reasons of expediency, 
but also for reasons of justice, be utilized for the payment 
or the securing of the enemy’s reparation or similar debts.’ 
15The Geneva Convention of 1929 prohibited confiscation 
of works of art, historical monuments, and all effects and 
objects of personal use by prisoners of war (except arms, 
horses, military papers, metal helmets and gas masks). 
Besides, in principle, international law restricted the 
taking or seizing of private enemy property. However, 
even after the Second World War, as Prof. H. A. Smith 
remarked, the ‘law of booty is almost unwritten’.16 It 
appears that enemy property during and after World War 
II was treated exactly as during and after World War I: 
‘no rule existed except that of the right of the sovereign 
to deal with enemy private property as the sovereign 
willed.’17 The old Roman comment ‘silent enimleges inter 
arma’ (for the laws are silent in the midst of arms/war) 
was still the norm.18
2.  ITALIAN PROPERTY IN ETHIOPIA 
UNDER BRITISH ADMINISTRATION
To make up for its relatively marginal colonial gain, 
Italy invested massively in occupied Ethiopia (1936-
1941), to the extent of risking economic deficit at home. 
Italy and its citizens heavily invested in transport and 
communication infrastructure (roads, post offices and 
telecommunication networks), public administration 
institutions, hotels, hospitals, aqueducts, car repair 
workshops and oxygen producing factories.19 Factories 
producing canvas, textiles, cement, beer, flour, biscuits, 
pasta, rope, boots and shoes and cigarettes mushroomed. 
There were also cotton mills, sawmills, tire-retreading 
plants, brick and tile factories and electric plants.20 The 
total outlay of such investments was estimated to be more 
than 90 million pounds.21 Ethiopia’s economic potential 
had caught the imaginations of Italian officials to solve 
15 Ibid., pp.181-2.
16 Downyer, ‘Captured Enemy…’, pp.488-9, 494.
17  Rubin, ‘Inviolability….’, p.170.
18  Cicero, Pio Milone, The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations, 5th ed. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), p.1081.
19 Michela Wrong, I Didn’t Do It For You: How the World Betrayed 
a Small African Nation (Pymble: HarperCollins Publishers, 2005), 
pp.140-1.
20 Richard Pankhurst, ‘Post-World War II Ethiopia’ in Journal of 
Ethiopian Studies, Vol.29, No. 1, (1996), p.46.
21 Sterling Joseph Coleman, Jr., ‘No Independence Without 
Sovereignty:	The	Resistance	 of	 Emperor	Hayläšɘllase	 I	 to	
the British Occupation of Ethiopia, 1941-1944’ in Aethopica-
International Journal of Eritrean and Ethiopian Studies, Vol.13 
(2010), p.58.
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Italy’s economic problems through the settlement of poor 
farmers and the exploitation of cheap agricultural and 
industrial labor in Ethiopia. 
The Anglo-Ethiopian campaign to liberate Ethiopia 
started in January 1941 and completed in eighteen 
months.22 However, the expropriation of Italian property 
by the British started before the end of Italian resistance 
in Gondar in November 1941. The British had dominated 
the disposal of Italian property until Ethiopia took over 
following the 1942 Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement and, more 
importantly, the 1944 Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement. Before 
1942, since they had recognized Ethiopia’s annexation 
by Italy in 1938, the British were tempted to consider 
Ethiopia as an Occupied Enemy Territory Administration 
(OETA), though theoretically an ‘Allied’ or ‘Associated’ 
member of the Allies23 since Ethiopia had formally entered 
into the war against Germany and its allies. Apparently, 
Ethiopia was never an OETA since the initial temptation 
of the British army officers to treat Ethiopia as such 
was rejected by the Foreign Office. However, Ethiopia 
was under de facto British military influence which 
enabled them to prevail on the fate of the Italians and 
their property in Ethiopia. To ease the removal of Italian 
property from Ethiopia, Emperor Haile Selassie I was 
forced to slow his entry into Addis Ababa.24 Shortly before 
the British transferred responsibility for enemy property to 
Ethiopia in 1942, most (about 80%) of enemy property of 
value was removed from Ethiopia.25 The British Custodian 
of Enemy Property handled Italian property in Ethiopia 
against the norms of Custodianship in international law, 
administering the properties on behalf of and in the best 
interest of its owners. More precisely, the British army, 
rather than the British Custodian, prevailed in what to do 
with enemy property.26
In removing Italian property, neither legal nicety nor 
fairness to Ethiopia influenced the British who wavered 
between selfish and objective rationales. Under Anglican 
racial prejudice to the Italians, the British disapproved 
the massive Italian investment in Ethiopia: “... it was so 
22 Haile Muluken, ‘A Diplomatic History of Ethio-Italian Relations, 
Ca. 1941-1991’ (PhD Dissertation: Addis Ababa University, 2014), 
p.53.
23 Harold, Marcus, ‘The Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of 31 July 1942: 
Did Ethiopia Become a British Protectorate?’, in David Chapple 
et al (Eds.) Proceedings of the XIVth International Conference of 
Ethiopian Studies, November 6-11, 2000, Vol.1 (Addis Ababa: 
Institute of Ethiopian Studies, 2002), pp.414-21. It offers a sound 
argument against the claim that Ethiopia had no sovereignty under 
the 1942 agreement especially in light of the practical conduct of 
Haile Selassie’s government. However, as regards the disposal of 
Italians and their property in Ethiopia, the British had no concern 
about Ethiopian sovereignty. 
24 Tafará Háylaselásie, Yaityoyáná Táláqua Britániá Yadiplomátic 
Tárik 1798-1966 E.C. (Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press, 
1999 Ethiopian Calender ( hereafter E.C.),pp.246, 266.
25 Coleman, ‘No Independence …’, pp.59-60; Wrong, I Didn’t …, 
p.141.
26 Haile, ‘A Diplomatic…, pp.95-100.
typical of these flamboyant, hot-headed Mediterranean 
types- for ‘overdeveloping’ the Horn.”27 The removal of 
property preceded the deportation of its Italian owners, 
who were tasked with safely dismantling industrial 
plants. The property of deported Italians was considered 
by the British as having lost its raison d’etre so that 
expropriating it for British wartime needs was more 
compelling than leaving it for ‘loot and destruction’ by 
Ethiopians.28 Advancing the erstwhile wartime argument 
of all governments, Britain compensated some of its 
wartime cost in Ethiopia and elsewhere at the expense 
of Italian property in Ethiopia. In the end, the British 
left less important items regarded as enough to meet 
the reasonable requirements of Ethiopia for several 
years, commenting that what remained was beyond the 
capacity of local expertise to run and was deteriorating.29 
Disregarding their racist motives and exaggerations, the 
British underestimation of the Ethiopian capacity to make 
proper use of Italian property was a genuine and realistic 
assessment.30
According to official statements, what the British 
removed from Ethiopia was immeasurable.31 Copious 
Italian medical supplies, such as medicines, bandages 
and ointments, were taken for use by British East African 
troops.32Oxygen producing factories were removed, 
leaving hospitals in Ethiopia to run without the life-
saving gas. The value of medical stores removed by the 
British was about £4 million.33 Engineering machineries, 
factories, garage equipment, printing machines, oil, heavy 
trucks, and so forth were transferred to Eritrea, Kenya and 
Tanganyika in the name of the war effort.34 Crankshaft 
grinders were shipped to Libya and used to repair 
tanks. Weapons and munitions were taken to Kenya. Of 
properties taken to India, Kenya and Uganda were road 
27 Wrong, I Didn’t …,pp.139, 146.
28 Richard Pankhurst, ‘Post-World War II Ethiopia: British Military 
Policy and Action for the Dismantling and Acquisition of Italian 
Factories and other Assets’ in Journal of Ethiopian Studies, Vol. 
XXIX, No. 1 (June 1996), pp.42-3.
29	 See	exchanges	between	the	Foreign	Office	and	the	British	Legation,	
August-November 1943, G.B. FO 371/300-35635, pp.22-3.
30 See for example Ministry of Interior to Ministry of Finance, 
Maskaram 25 1967 E.C., No. 297445/44, National Archives and 
Library Agency (NALA0, File No. 17.1.1.82.05. It reveals that a 
tractor, thresher and other equipments (of about two tones) were 
deteriorating in disuse and left to the corrosive effect of rainfall 
and sunshine. The problem was reported by Kossá Waradá of Bale 
administrative region to the Ministry of Interior in 1940 E.C. Yet the 
latter ministry called to the Ministry of Finance for action after about 
27 years which gave orders to the respective government institution 
to prepare an auction for the sale of the property and deposit the 
proceedings in an account opened for that purpose in the National 
Bank of Ethiopia.
31	 See	exchanges	between	the	Foreign	Office	and	the	British	Legation,	
August-November 1943, G.B. FO 371/300-35635, pp.22-3.
32 Comment sent to New Times and Ethiopia News by Evelyn 
Clayton,	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	Archives	(MOFAA),	Fol.	No.	
13,	file	No.	66.
33 Wrong, I Didn’t …, p.139-146.
34 Tafará, Yainglizná Táláqua…, pp.256-7.
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building equipment, a brick factory, an oxygen factory, 
soap-making equipment, diesel tractors, water-boring 
works, sawmills, mining machinery, and so forth.35
Under British political and military domination, 
powerless Ethiopia could hardly protest against the 
removal of enemy property, a stance mistaken by the 
British for consent. Haile Selassie did not protest the 
removal of 26 small mechanical workshops, six oxygen 
factories and the Pirelli Retreading Plant by way of direct 
requisitioning or private purchase through negotiation 
with private owners. The British took equipment from 
eight heavy repair workshops informing the Emperor but 
not securing his consent. He is said to have permitted the 
removal of 21 Lancia workshops and machinery from 26 
small mechanical workshops while written permission 
is claimed for the removal of 13 road making machines, 
19 items of sawmilling machinery, 20 petrol pumps, one 
crankshaft grinder, 24 ‘scrapa’ metal [sic], and 100 cubic 
meters of timber.36 Several trucks and other valuable 
enemy property were taken from the Italians with or 
without payment.37 There were many cases in which 
British officers removed enemy war materials and other 
property without informing the Emperor.38
To  l e s sen  E th iop ians  d i sa ff ec t ion  wi th  the 
disproportional loot of spoil by the British and South 
African troops, the British appointed a Joint Anglo-
Ethiopian Committee for enemy property. While this 
arrangement gave Ethiopians some share of the looting, 
the Committee did not prevent the removal of property 
in the name of serving British wartime needs. Workshop 
equipment, capable of maintaining 600 vehicles a year, 
was taken to Kenya with all the 1200 Italian workers. 
The Pirelli tire factory plant was taken to Kenya while 
an oxygen factory, having a daily production capacity of 
700 cubic meters, was taken to Eritrea. Other removals 
include a printing press, carpet factory machinery, 
woodwork workshop equipment, heavy vehicles assembly 
and maintenance equipment, pharmaceuticals factory 
equipment and an unknown amount of money and gold 
to Kenya.39 From about 40,000 registered enemy vehicles 
before the end of occupation, only about six thousand 
were transferred to the Ethiopian Custodian in 1942. 
35 Wrong, I Didn’t…, 2005), p.141.
36 War Office to the British Legation, January 22, 1942, G.B. FO 
371/300-35635, pp.22-33.
37	 British	Civil	Affairs	Branch	in	Nairobi	to	the	War	Office,	January	
26, 1945, G.B. FO 371/300-35635; War Office to Foreign Office, 
23June 1941, G.B. FO/371/323, file 46089. Oxygen bottles were 
requisitioned on unknown date but paid for on September 8, 1941 
but values were unknown. Another two oxygen plants privately 
owned by Societa Anonima Fabbriche Riunite Etiopiche Ossigeno 
(F.R.E.O) were requisitioned on 26, January 1942 for four hundred 
pounds and the plant was removed in March 1942. But, no payment 
was made, although the owner claimed 11, 500 pounds.
38	 A	complaint	letter	by	Sylvia	Pankhurst	to	Foreign	Office,	October	
1941, G.B. FO371-279-27522, pp.11-20. 
39 Tafará, Yainglizná Táláqua…, pp.256-7.
Likewise, about 80% of Italian mechanical equipment was 
removed from Ethiopia by the British.40 Obviously, not all 
of these appropriations could be justified by the British 
wartime needs. 
3 .   I TA L I A N  P R O P E R T Y  U N D E R 
ETHIOPIAN ADMINISTRATION
The Legal and Institutional Setting
Under the terms of Article XIII of the 1942 Anglo-
Ethiopian Agreement and Military Convention, Ethiopia 
had to requisition and hand over requested Italian assets 
to the British. After the agreement, the British protested 
against perceived illegal or arbitrary conduct by the 
Ethiopian Custodian.41 Nonetheless, Ethiopia ignored 
British warnings of ‘legal consequences’ and openly stood 
against British demands for enemy property. A fight over 
a sisal factory left five Ethiopian and two British colonial 
troops dead. Ethiopia also rejected a British demand 
to remove a radio transmission station, road-making 
equipment and a cement factory, causing the British to 
regret the granting of independence to Ethiopia. When 
Haile Selassie steadfastly resisted what he regarded as 
excessive British demands, the latter sought to avoid 
the political cost of fighting over less valuable enemy 
properties. By August 1942, the British decided to ‘…
write off Ethiopia as a source of supply of any plant or 
machinery’, after taking 80% of Italian property.42
After the 1942 Agreement, Ethiopia established its 
Custodian of Enemy Property Administration, effective 
from 28 May 1942, under the Ministry of Production 
and Industries.43 The Custodian was meant to protect 
enemy property until its fate was decided after the war. 
The Custodian could decide about enemy property as he 
deemed fit until the owner, or a legitimate representative, 
appeared and filed claims.44 The law was very liberal 
regarding the Custodian’s authorities and responsibilities 
in administering enemy property. He could accept or 
reject claims of agency or power of attorney on behalf 
of the owner. He could collect any debts or sums owed 
to any owner of enemy property or business; sell it by 
public auction, tender or reach any private agreement on 
any perishable goods, furniture, trade stocks, livestock, 
40	 War	Office	to	Foreign	Office,	23June	1941,	G.B.	FO/371/323,	file	
46089. Detailed list of requisitioned and removed items was made 
on 21st	August	1945	but	not	attached.	G.B.	FO/371/323	file	46114,	
p.183.
41 The Civil Affairs Branch, HQ of East Africa Command to the 
Ministry of Interior, EAC/CEP/A/137CA, August 17, 1943, NALA, 
File No. File No. 1.213.12.
42 Sterling, ‘No Independence …, pp.59-60.
43	 Archives	of	Şeháfe	Te’ezaz	Walda-Masqal	Tariku	Memorial	
Research Center, I.E.S., Addis Ababa University (hereafter Walda-
Masqal Archives), section of ‘Enemy Property’ (hereafter E.P.) Audit 
Report, Fol. No. 134.
44 Negarit Gazetta, Enemy Property Proclamation, 1942.
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produce or crops on farms; grant temporary leases of any 
enemy property; make arrangements for the carrying out 
of any business; maintain, retain or remove to safe custody 
any enemy property; pay, at his discretion, any rates, 
taxes or other impositions due for any enemy property or 
business; make any other disbursements which he might 
deem necessary or proper; acquire and hold any property 
movable or immovable; and enter into any contracts and 
execute any deed. The Custodian or his assistant would 
not be personally liable for any act committed or omission 
made by him or on his behalf in relation to any enemy 
property or business in the exercise or purported exercise 
of any powers conferred upon him under the proclamation 
and he was indemnified in regard to any such act or 
omission.45
To a limited extent the Ethiopian Custodian dealt 
with enemy property within the framework of ideal 
international norms. Some Italians received their property 
or its monetary value. Occasionally, the Custodian 
rejected allegedly undue requests for enemy property by 
government officials and acquaintances.46 In some cases 
high profile public figures and ordinary people acquired 
enemy property by paying the assessed price.47
At the same time, Ethiopia was committed to 
compensate the damage that the state and its citizens 
suffered during the occupation.48 Ethiopia used enemy 
property to equip and renovate government palaces, 
offices, libraries and so forth while using Italian 
buildings to house administrative offices, hospitals, 
and laboratories.49 This was also how, for instance, 
the Ethiopian Embassy in Djibouti was furnished. The 
Emperor had restricted government purchases only 
to items that were unavailable from enemy property 
storage.50 The procurement of some goods and services by 
government institutions was financed by revenue from the 
Custodian of Enemy Property while vital properties and oil 
stocks in the Custodian’s stores were directly transferred 
to government institutions. The cost of deporting Italians 
was paid by the Custodian. The Custodian paid the unpaid 
taxes from enemy businesses and properties because such 
taxes could not be brought upon the individuals who had 
incurred them.51 Private and state enemy vehicles found 
scattered throughout the country were indiscriminately 
sequestrated by Custodian of Government Property, rather 
45 See Art.1-8 of Enemy Property Proclamation, Negarit Gazeta 
1942.
46 Walda-Masqal Archives, E.P., Fol. 5/525.
47 Ibid., Fol. 11/525. The type of restored goods vary, for example, 
looking glasses, photo albums, forks, cars, and so forth.
48 Compensation Claims Submission Form, NALA, File No. 
Ministry of Interior Files, No. 1.511.
49 Teláhun, Ya20ñáw…, pp.228-9; Comment to New Times and 
Ethiopia News by	Evelyn	Clayton,	MOFAA,	Fol.	No.	13,	file	No.	
66;	British	Legation,	Addis	Ababa,	to	Foreign	Office,	November	23,	
1946, G.B. FO/371, 336- 63138.
50 Ibid.
51 Walda-Masqal Archives, E.P., Fol. 5/525 and Fol. 461/515.
than the Custodian of Enemy Property, on the grounds that 
all of them were used by the Italian state for war purposes. 
This decision was passed by the Ministry of Interior.52
Compensations to citizens were calculated on the 
estimated price of damaged properties. Compensation 
claims, genuine and inflated (these ranged from 350 birr 
to 648,595 birr), were collected from almost all parts of 
Ethiopia. Examples of damages included the death of 
livestock, spoiled grains and cereals and destruction of 
forests, coffee trees, houses and household goods from air 
bombardment. The amount of compensation claims by the 
people was below the government’s expectations so much 
that, in April 1946, the government urged its citizens to 
submit their claims or face a fine of one birr. There is 
no doubt that the disposal of enemy property contributed 
to the emergence and growth of the middle class in 
Ethiopia.53 Besides, Ethiopians, on whose land Italians 
built assets, took enemy property, paying for the value 
added to the government.54 Such Ethiopians were among 
the fortunate survivors of the of Italian occupation, for 
they resumed possession of their former houses, that were 
also completely renovated with electric light, running 
water, sanitation facilities, and equipped with European 
furniture.55 The emperor considered these restorations as 
a ‘gracious act’ which shows that he considered himself 
as the supreme owner of enemy property, which had no 
justification, while his central role in property transfers 
might have helped him stabilize a politically corrupt 
system. 
I t  was  l eg i t ima te  fo r  the  Cus tod ian  to  pay 
administrative expenses, including rents for commercial 
property, from the proceeds of enemy holdings. 
However, other activities by the Custodian were marred 
by illegitimate conduct with very little or no regard 
for the principles of Custodianship. The ability of the 
Custodian to perform according to international norms 
was undermined by the internal and external conditions 
of the Custodian. Internally, employees appropriated 
enemy properties through various corrupt practices. 
Italians were employed since their technical competence 
was irreplaceable, but they used that opportunity to 
advance their own, and fellow Italians, interests in 
52 Walda-Masqal Archives, E.P., Fol. 16/525; Minute of a 
Commission in the Ministry of Interior, Ginbot 13 1935 (E.C.), 
No. 4317 in Custodian of Enemy Property Files, No. 13.15; See 
exchanges of Ministry of Interior( MOI), yasaragalánáyáwtomobil 
T/bét,	Shawá	Governorate	and	the	Ministry	of	Pen	in	the	files	of	the	
Custodian of Enemy Property, Fol. 13/15; Notice of the Ministry of 
Interior, Magabit 10 1937 E.C., Ministry of Interior Files, in NALA, 
File No. 1.511; From two compensation claims submission, Ministry 
of Interior, NALA, Files, No. 1.511.
53 Haile, ‘A Diplomatic…, pp.104-12.
54 Walda-Masqal Archives, E.P., Fol. 461/515.
55 British Legation to Foreign Office, August 13, 1943, G.B. FO 
371/300-35635, p.86.
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different ways.56 The Italians would typically discard 
original price estimates if buyers happened to be Italian 
while they would inflate prices if Ethiopians offered 
their own estimates. Bent on benefitting Italians and 
harming Ethiopians, Italian employees offered significant 
deductions to their compatriots (for instance from 1000 
birr to 300, from 1500 birr to 300, and from 1500 birr 
to 190). In a contrary manner, they would inflate their 
prices when Ethiopians showed an interest in buying. 
Alternatively, assessors would prepare significant 
deductions (as large as ¾ of the original price) if the 
buyers offered a bribe of half of the deducted price.57 In 
this way the Derèdawá Cotton Mill was sold for 37, 000 
birr, which was less than a quarter of the original cost 
estimate.58
As the sole price determiners, Italian employees 
opposed the sale of some properties through threatening 
resignation from their jobs or delaying the process of price 
estimation. What Italians could buy in two days would 
take months, if the buyers were Ethiopian, with regular 
visits and waste of time.59 Delaying tactics by the Italians 
were meant to prevent Ethiopians from buying valuable 
properties and to prolong the tenure of their employment.60 
Such employees of the Custodian office took the liberty of 
exchanging spare vehicle parts in the stores, thus leaving 
broken cars available for sale.61 Italian employees were 
also blamed for using sophisticated techniques that made 
their Ethiopian colleagues appear responsible for their 
own theft. Theft conducted in this way was responsible 
for disappearance of numerous properties. These 
machinations were perceived by observers as an Italian 
act of revenge on Ethiopians.62
Ethiopian employees of the Custodian also had corrupt 
practices. Some Italians had their sequestration receipts, 
issued by the British, taken away by the Custodian to 
disallow compensation claims.63 Top officials of the 
Custodian, Ato Waldaberhán T. Háymánot and Ato Berru 
Makonnen, were noted for embezzlement through the 
free transfer and underselling of enemy property for 
themselves. Some proceeds from enemy property were 
distributed to employees of the Custodian under the guise 
of loans.64
Further undermining good custodianship, the office 
was powerless against interference from officials of 
government institutions and influential persons. Haile 
56 Custodian of Enemy Property to Chief Security Director, 
Maskaram	13,	1936,	N0.155,	NALA,	File	No.	file	No.	1.213.17.
57 Walda-Masqal Archives, E.P., Fol. 7/168; Bahru, Society, State…, 
p.177. 
58	 G.B.	FO/371/323,	file	46096.
59 Walda-Masqal Archives, E.P., Fol. 7/168.
60 Ibid., Fol. 7/168; Walda-Masqal Archives, E.P., Fol. 11/525.
61 Ibid., Fol. 13/525.
62 Ibid., Fol. 7/168.
63  Exchanges between the British Legation and Foreign Office, 
November	1945,	G.B.	FO/371/323,	file	46096.
64 Walda-Masqal Archives, E.P., Fol. 13/525.
Selassie had free reign to distribute enemy property for 
political, economic and administrative reasons. He took 
advantage of enemy property to increase his popularity 
and benefit his family and favorites.65 Major enemy 
properties, such as the St. George Brewery, Anbassá 
City Bus, Compagnia Nazionale Imprese Eletriche 
(CONIEL), hotels, big buildings, and so forth were 
taken by the Emperor,66 and his sons and daughters 
until nationalized by the government.67 High officials, 
princesses, and princess took enemy properties either at 
unreasonable prices or for free without the authorization 
of the Custodian. The guard of the Custodian store could 
not stop a person heading to the enemy property store 
if the latter claims that his action ‘is authorized by the 
prince’.68 The Custodian could not resist powerful figures 
who boasted of their patriotic deeds during the war of 
resistance. Even people whose military contributions were 
at best questionable purchased enemy properties below 
estimated prices.69
Rather than the legality of exploiting enemy property, 
Haile Selassie’s preoccupation was with the politically 
motivated distribution of enemy property among rival 
claimants: top officials who were exiles, patriots and even 
collaborators who articulated their respective credentials 
for entitlements to enemy property. Among the notable 
officials who benefited in this way were Rás Asráta 
Kássá, Rás G/Hiwat Miká’el, Lej Dastá Berhánamasqal, 
Lej Aráyá Ababa, and Col. Ababa Walda Selássè. The 
Emperor also distributed many houses to individuals 
as gifts.70 Most Italian houses were given to exiles and 
collaborators while very influential patriots took enemy 
properties without authorization by the Emperor or the 
Custodian. Examples include Rás Ababa Aragay,71Daj. 
GarasuDuki72, Lej Masfen Selashi73, Lej	Ababa	Shanquţé,	
and Qañ. Dagfé.	Such	heavyweight	officials	disposed	of	
enemy property to benefit their followers and relatives, 
mostly with no care about the attitude of the Custodian or 
ignoring his expressed opposition.74 They refused to pay 
rents and evicted lawful inhabitants to transfer ownership 
to favored ones. Municipalities were unwilling to heed to 
the Custodian’s request to handover enemy property under 
their illegal possession.75 Civil servants of the Ministry of 
65 Ibid.,Fol.	134:	7,	34,	41	and	other	file	numbers.	
66 Teláhun …, Ya20ñáw …, p.384.
67 Ibid., pp.384-5; Bahru, Society, State…, p.171.
68 Walda-Masqal Archives, E.P., Fol. 2/171/272/326.
69 Ibid.,	Fol.	134/	7,	34,	41	and	other	file	numbers.	
70 Teláhun, Ya20ñáw…, pp.384-85., pp.228-9.
71 Walda-Masqal Archives, E.P., Fol. 1/54.
72 Complaint by a worker of the Custodian in Sidámo to the MOI, 
NALA, File No. 1.213.12.
73 Illubábor Governor to Ministry of Interior Illubábor branch, 
Hámlé 24, 1935, attaching the complaints of Rás Masfen Selashi.
74 WellegaGovernorate to QelamAwraja, Miazia 2, 1942 E.C., No. 
6342,	NALA,	File	No.	file	No.	1.213.17.
75 Exchanges of the Custodian of Enemy Property with Ministry of 
Interior, Sané 8, 1935 E.C., No. 3972, NALA, Maskaram 19 1935 
E.C., No. 194 (all letters in NALA, File No. File No. 1.213.12.
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Interior would refuse the demands of the Custodian to pay 
rent for the enemy houses they were inhabiting illegally. 
The Custodian could only write warning letters against 
such illegal practices,76 all to no avail.77 In fact, various 
municipalities and branches of the Ministry of Interior had 
assigned their own guards over the heads of the guards 
assigned by the Custodian of Enemy Property thereby 
denying the latter access to and control over some enemy 
properties.78
Given the rampant evasion of rents by illegal 
occupants, the underpriced sale and free transfer of 
enemy property, it is not surprising that administrative 
expenses of the Custodian were unsustainable. Because 
of mismanagement and corruption, the revenue of the 
Custodian, including the credit allowed for purchases, 
was close to its administrative cost. Some running 
expenses were paid using only sheets of white paper with 
handwritten receipts, which made the financial accounting 
difficult, exposing the transactions to fraud to the extent 
that, at one point, the Custodian couldn’t afford the 
salaries of its employees. Later, when the government 
decided to turn all enemy property into government 
property, employees insisted upon receiving the arrears of 
all salary owed them.79 As the British noted, Ethiopians 
felt entitled to enemy assets and the Custodian acted as a 
government official, although in a strict legal sense he was 
not supposed to act as such.80 This can be further attested 
from the complaints lodged by Italian victims, as shown 
below. 
Before July 1946, Ethiopia wanted to retain Italian 
investors at the expense of the British policy of 
deporting Italians from Ethiopia. Italian industrialists and 
businessmen were given wide assurances of freedom of 
work, the absolute protection of their interests, and were 
all duly subjected to income tax which was regularly paid. 
When Italy and Ethiopia could not agree in the Paris peace 
treaty negotiations in 1946, Italian investors were ordered 
to leave Ethiopia within eight days. Immediately, officials 
and armed guards of the Ethiopian Custodian of Enemy 
Property, confiscated industrial and commercial plants as 
well as the private residences of Italian investors. A hasty 
and arbitrary inventory was conducted by officials of 
the Custodian in the absence of owners. The registration 
of factories, machineries, engines, equipment, spare 
parts, motor vehicles and so forth was conducted against 
76 See proclamation on Negarit Gazetta, Genbot 11 1934 E.C. No. 
14.
77  Custodian of Enemy Property to Ministry of Interior, Maskaram 
19, 1935 E.C., No. 194; Custodian of Enemy Property to Ministry 
of Interior, Sané 18 1935 E.C., No. 4091, NALA, File No. File No. 
1.213.12.
78 Haile, ‘A Diplomatic…, pp.115-120. 
79 Walda-Masqal Archives, E.P., Fol. 461/515, 5/525.
80 Exchanges between the British Legation and Foreign Office, 
November	1945,	G.B.	FO/371/323,	file	46096.
economic reality.81
Italians who refused to comply with the demands 
of the Custodian had their properties seized.82 Italians 
were forced by armed police to sign the hasty inventory 
of their property while their own descriptions of their 
property were ignored. The offices of owners were 
searched for important papers and documents, concerning 
financial deals, requisition certificates, lawsuits in course 
and in abeyance, and so forth in addition to third party 
papers and properties belonging to POWs entrusted to 
them. Foreigners were warned not to purchase Italian 
properties and the Public Motor Car Registration Office 
was instructed not to permit Italians to sell their vehicles. 
Italians who attempted to revoke arbitrary sequestration 
orders through court rulings usually failed since the court 
hearings were staged after the Italians concerned had been 
expelled from the country. Italians had their telephone 
communication cut and the streets leading to the court, 
the residences of their lawyers, and the foreign embassies, 
were all blocked to prevent Italians from reaching the 
High Court or to deter them from getting the assistance of 
foreign representatives. Those who succeeded in reaching 
the Court, litigated without their legal advocate who was 
prevented from leaving his home by the police. Italians 
who attended court hearings were arrested upon leaving 
the court and were jailed together with prisoners guilty of 
crime. Italians under house arrest were subjected to arrest 
warrants and taken to prison the next day.83
Hence, the apologetic claims that 1) Italian private 
dwellings, factories, land, movable and immovable 
properties were guarded from injury, 2) the rent or selling 
price of enemy property was based on fair valuation and 3) 
the proceeds were banked for the Italian owner84 were not 
entirely correct.
4.  ITALIAN PROPERTY IN THE DIPLOMATIC 
ARENA
Safeguarding Italian state and private property in East 
Africa could not be achieved even after the installation 
of a pro-western government in Italy. When, on April 17, 
81 From the petition signed by 80 businessmen and technicians who 
were	deported	from	Ethiopia.,	Foreign	Office	to	the	British	Legation	
October 14 1946, G.B.FO 371/329-534491, p.136.
82 Ibid., Some of the assets taken over were the firm of Paganoni 
Angelo,	timber	industry;	the	firm	of	Paganoni	Angelo	and	Baschiera,	
plywood industry; the firm of Dotta- Electro mechanical industry, 
accumulator factory; the firm of Zingone- clothing, haberdashery 
general store; the firm of Lasagna- sweets and cakes factory; the 
firm	of	Ingallina,	Atlantic	Restaurant;	 the	firm	of	Trobato-	Butcher	
and provisions and S.A.S.E.D.E.- chemical industry, oxygen and 
carbide factory.
83 From the petition signed by 80 businessmen and technicians who 
were	deported	from	Ethiopia.,	Foreign	Office	to	the	British	Legation	
October 14 1946, G.B.FO 371/329-534491, p.136.
84 A memorandum by Sylvia Pankhurst to the Foreign Office, 
December	1945,	G.B.FO/371/323,	file	46089.
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1950, an Italian diplomat complained about the British 
treatment of Italian property in Eritrea, he was upfront 
that he was not raising a legal claim. The property 
in question related to naval facilities, a hospital, oil 
storage tankers, electrical installations, customs offices 
and buildings. The British defended themselves, rather 
arrogantly, saying that the destruction was not wanton 
but economically sound, in order to not waste British 
taxpayers’ money in protecting buildings that would 
after all collapse from humidity, or after looting by 
‘natives’. Intending to avoid the legal consequences, 
the British had denied the Four Powers Commission 
of the UN for Eritrea access to the inventory of Italian 
property they removed, requisitioned and destroyed. 
According to the Eritrean Chamber of Commerce, 
the monetary value of the Italian property in Eritrea 
was close to a contemporary sum of £1.85 billion.85 
When Eritrea became federated with Ethiopia in 1952, 
the British demanded that Ethiopia compensate for 
the administrative costs they had incurred in Eritrea, 
£950,000. The British military in East Africa was 
instructed from London to maximize their material 
appropriations so that the British would have no 
commitment to compensate Ethiopia for the Italian 
property removed from Ethiopia. Americans were 
relieved that Axis propagandists did not use the 
Ethiopian example to warn Norway, Belgium, Holland, 
France, Poland and Greece about the dangers of 
‘liberation’.86
Italian property requisitioned before the signing of 
the Anglo-Ethiopian 1942 Agreement was removed by 
the British who felt no obligation to make payments to 
Ethiopia. In 1945, pro-Ethiopian publications accused the 
British military of taking Italian medical supplies worth 
70,000,000 £ between 1941 and 42 and that the British 
took 85% of property of value.87 This was interpreted 
by the British as Ethiopia’s bargaining weapon for the 
peace settlement, especially in order to obtain the return 
of Eritrea with all its Italian technical equipment88 
and as an attempt to externalize responsibility for the 
improper management of enemy property which ‘the 
British Custodian duly surrendered to them’. Ethiopia 
had refused to give a certificate of indemnity to the 
British East African Command in Nairobi, by which 
they had wanted to protect themselves at the peace 
conference.89 To strengthen its claims at the peace 
conference, Ethiopia maintained that the high value of 
85 Wrong, I Didn’t …, pp.116-7, 135-6.
86 Ibid., p.133-44.
87 A memorandum by Sylvia Pankhurst to the Foreign Office, 
December	1945,	G.B.FO/371/323,	file	46089.
88	 Exchanges	between	the	British	Legation	and	Foreign	Office	about	
the Ethiopian Custodian of Enemy Property, April-August 1945, 
G.B.	FO	371/300,	file	35635,	pp,	91,	100.
89 Ibid.,321,	file	46096.
Italian property removed by the British amounted to its 
contribution to the Allied war effort.90
For fear of a propaganda war with Ethiopia, the 
British decided to not publicize their own stewardship 
of enemy property for which Ethiopia could not produce 
evidence. According to the Financial Advisor of the 
British Legation, F.C. Stafford, there was little prospect 
of returning enemy property to its legitimate owners since 
all enemy assets were regarded as spoils of war. This 
was particularly the case with category ‘A’ properties 
which included money and valuables taken to Kenya for 
‘safe keeping’.91 From the outset, the British had decided 
to leave behind category ‘B’ and ‘C’ properties.92 The 
conduct of British and Ethiopian Custodians didn’t tally 
with the universal ideal of preserving enemy property in 
contemplation of postwar arrangements93 or of disposing 
it in the best interests of its owners. Hence, the British and 
Ethiopian Custodians did not administer enemy private 
property according to international law.94
For the British Foreign Office, the misconduct of 
the British and Ethiopian Custodians could be forgiven 
on account of the ‘draconian methods’ the Italians had 
applied in exacting Ethiopian private property.95 It 
therefore appears as if Ethiopia and Britain had tacitly 
agreed to avoid taking responsibility for their breaches 
of international law through inserting self-serving terms 
in the eventual peace treaty. Hence, the British declined 
Italian requests for clarification about the disposal of their 
property in Ethiopia. For the British, the Italians could not 
talk about international law and spoliation for what they 
did in Ethiopia, and there was little chance for Ethiopians 
to be accused of any irregularities in the management 
of enemy property.96 Although Italy demanded British 
help regarding enemy property in Ethiopia in the 
name of maintaining European prestige in Africa, the 
British refused to involve themselves in what they now 
considered a matter to be handled by the Ethiopians only.97
During the 1947 peace conference in Paris, Ethiopia 
demanded the nationalization of all Italian property, 
arguing that it all had been obtained by force during the 
war and that, contrary to diplomatic norms, the embassy 
had been used for military purposes up to 1941. After a 
90 A memorandum by Sylvia Pankhurst to the Foreign Office, 
December	1945,	G.B.FO/371/323,	file	46089.
91	 Exchanges	between	the	British	Legation	and	Foreign	Office	about	
the Ethiopian Custodian of Enemy Property, April-August 1945, 
G.B.	FO/371/321,	file	46096.
92 Pankhurst, ‘Post-World War II Ethiopia…’, p.48.
93	 Exchanges	between	the	British	Legation	and	Foreign	Office	about	
the Ethiopian Custodian of Enemy Property, April-August 1945, 
G.B.	FO	371/300,	file	35635,	pp,	91,	100.
94 Ibid., pp.102-103 (see the section of the comments by F.C. 
Stafford,	Financial	Advisor).
95 Ibid., p.110.
96	 Exchanges	between	the	British	Legation	and	Foreign	Office	about	
Italian	property,	July-September	1946,	G.B.	FO	371/328,	file	53474,	
pp.22, 25.
97 Ibid., p.27.
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lengthy and heated debate, the Four Great Powers decided 
Ethiopia was entitled to nationalize the embassy. In the 
end, Ethiopia was able to nationalize state and private 
Italian property worth millions of dollars.98 As stated 
above, enemy properties, including the Italian Embassy, 
had already been confiscated, so the Ethiopian delegates 
seem to have been demanding the approval of what 
Ethiopia had already done before the peace conference. 
However, the 1947 Allied Peace Treaty with Italy 
clearly states that Italy had renounced all state and 
parastatal properties, but not private Italian properties 
and diplomatic or consular premises. The only enemy 
property which Ethiopia was empowered to nationalize 
was ‘...movable and immovable property of the Italian 
State of local authorities and of public institutions and 
publicly owned companies and associations, as well as 
movable and immovable property formerly belonging 
to the Fascist Party or its auxiliary organizations’.99 
However, by the time the treaty was ratified, Ethiopia 
and Britain had already breached international law by 
the indiscriminate expropriation of private as well as 
Italian state property. The positive response given to 
Ethiopia’s claims for Italian property in the Peace Treaty 
could be attributed to the tacit support the British gave to 
Ethiopia, since making Ethiopia responsible for the illegal 
appropriation of the Italian property in Ethiopia would 
have raised questions about the British role in this abuse. 
In the Paris Peace Treaty, Italy recognized the sovereignty 
and independence of the State of Ethiopia and the legality 
of all measures which the Government of Ethiopia had 
taken or would take in order to annul Italian measures 
in Ethiopia taken after 3 October 1935, and the effects 
of such measures, including the legality of all Ethiopian 
annulments, modifying concessions, or any special rights 
granted to Italian nationals.100
The question of Italian property was once and for all 
resolved through a lengthy bilateral negotiation between 
Ethiopia and Italy in which the former agreed to renounce 
part of its compensation claims. Accordingly, Italy’s 
treaty obligation to pay 25 million dollars in reparation 
to Ethiopia was reduced to 16 million dollars.101 The 
deduction was justified by the large amount of Italian 
property Ethiopia had nationalized.102 The favorable peace 
treaty agreements, generously sponsored by the great 
98 Getachew Tedla, Aklilu Remembers (Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa 
University Press, 2011), p.162.
99 Treaty of Peace with Italy, Paris, February 10, 1947, Art. 34. 
ANNEX XIV.
100 Ibid., Arts. 33-36.
101 Agreement Between Italy And Ethiopia Concerning The 
Settlement Of Economic And Financial Matters Issuing From The 
Treaty Of Peace And Economic Collaboration. Signed At Addis 
Ababa, On 5 March 1956, United Nations, Treaty Series, Vols. 49 
And 50, Art. VI (b).
102 Calchi Novati, ‘Re-establishing Italo-Ethiopian Relations after 
the War: Old Prejudices and New Policies’ in Northeast African 
Studies, vol.3, No. 1 (1996), p.40.
powers, had very little actual role since concerted bilateral 
engagements proved more important than any unenforced 
international treaty formulated in multilateral forums.103
CONCLUSION
Longitudinal historical data does not tally with the 
seemingly lofty pledge of safeguarding the private property 
of enemy state citizens. Up to WWII, the administration 
of enemy property was, for the most part, approached 
from a purely political point of view, rather than from 
normative legal principles. Despite high-sounding legal 
provisions about the sanctity of enemy state citizens’ 
private property, in reality, custodians deviated from their 
mandate because of wartime needs of the state, the claims 
of war compensation, corruption, and other factors. In the 
Ethiopian case too, victors invoked economic, political, 
racial and emotional arguments to rationalize the unlawful 
embezzlement of enemy property, both state and private. 
Victors also cooperated on the international stage to 
avoid responsibility by sponsoring self-serving clauses 
in the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty. What Ethiopia, Britain 
and Italy did with regard to the property of their defeated 
enemy had much in common with the long tradition of 
the appropriation of plunder. Hence, the war caused the 
unexpected downward and upward economic mobility 
of Italians and Ethiopians respectively, while enabling 
Britain and Ethiopia to finance state expenses using 
proceeds from enemy property. The idea and practice 
of the custodianship of enemy property reveals how the 
fortune of private and government business undertakings 
is affected by non-market forces. The Second World War 
witnessed an important deviation because of the America 
innovation of post-war reconstruction program extended 
to defeated powers. While this is obviously different 
from the idea of custodianship of enemy property, future 
researchers could ponder how that represents change and 
continuity in the interaction of warring states. 
I would like to record my indebtedness and gratitude for the 
generous financial support and research facility availed to me 
by the Gotha Research Center of Erfurt University in Germany 
where I enjoyed a thriving academic culture as a postdoctoral 
research fellow assisted by the Herzog-Ernst-Scholarship, 
February to June 2017. Special mention is due to Prof. Iris 
Schröder for her overall mentorship and Dr. Stephen Anthony 
Walsh for practical help in writing this article.
REFERENCES
Bahru, Z. (2008). Society, state and history: Selected essays. 
Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press.
Calchi, N. (1996). Re-establishing Italo-Ethiopian relations after 
the war: Old prejudices and new policies. Northeast African 
Studies, 3(1).
103 Haile, ‘A Diplomatic…, p.374.
33 Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
Haile Muluken Akalu (2019). 
Canadian Social Science, 15(2), 23-33
Coleman, S. J. (2010). No independence without sovereignty: 
The	 resistance	of	 emperor	Hayläšɘllasei	 to	 the	British	
occupation of Ethiopia, 1941-1944. Aethopica-International 
Journal of Eritrean and Ethiopian Studies, 13.
Creveld, M. V. (1977). Supplying War: Logistics from 
Wallenstein to Patton. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Downyer, W. G. (1950). Captured enemy property. The 
American Journal of International Law, 44(3).
Getachew, T. (2011). Aklilu Remembers. Addis Ababa: Addis 
Ababa University Press.
Haile, M. (2014). ‘A Diplomatic History of Ethio-Italian 
Relations, Ca. 1941-1991’. Ph.D. dissertation: Addis Ababa 
University.
Marcus, H. G. (2000). The Anglo-Ethiopian treaty of 31 July 
1942: Did Ethiopia become a British protectorate? In D. 
Chapple (Ed.), Proceedings of the XIVth International 
Conference of Ethiopian Studies, 1. 
Milone, C. P. (1946). The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pankhurst, R. (1996). Post-world war in Ethiopia: British 
military policy and action for the dismantling and 
acquisition of Italian factories and other assets. Journal of 
Ethiopian Studies, XXIX(1).
Potterf, R. M. (1927). Treatment of alien enemy property in war 
time and after by the United States. Indiana Law Journal, 
2(6).
Rubin, S. J. (1950). Inviolability of enemy private property. 
American Journal of International Law, XCV .
Tafará, H. (1999 E.C.). Yaityoṕyáná Táláqua Britániá 
Yadiplomátic Tárik 1798-1966 E.C. Addis Ababa: Addis 
Ababa University Press.
Wawro, G. (2007). The Austro-Prussian War: Austria’s War 
with Prussia and Italy in 1866. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Wrong, M. (2005). I didn’t do it for you: How the world betrayed 
a small African nation. Pymble, Australia: HarperCollins 
Publishers.
